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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND
ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORP. AND
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
13610

CORRECTED APPELLANTS BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Suit by architect for additional fees claimed to be
owed for extra architectural services and expenses resulting from changes ordered by Defendants in the
design and construction of the Metropolitan Hall of
Justice complex.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Court granted summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs claims.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of summary judgment of dismissal and
remand for trial on the merits.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County employed
Beecher (plaintiff) as architect for the Metropolitan
Hall of Justice Complex (R. 27 & 36), appointed the
Salt Lake City Engineer as their representative and
required that Beecher ". . . perform and conduct all
required services under his direction and supervision
. . ." (R. 32, Par. 13). Under the direction and supervision of the City Engineer Beecher for approximately
10 months prepared schematic and preliminary studies
on the design of a proposed single high-rise building
and had earned a fee to that point of about $120,000.00
(R. 286) when the Defendant (acting through a citizens' advisory committee) decided not to build a highrise, to change the basic concept for the project (R.
286-289) and to start over. Beecher, who had been
paid nothing to that point, was coerced by economic
duress (in view of the large amount expended by
Beecher on plans which were scrapped) into accepting
a partial payment of $36,000.00 as a part of the total fee
that Defendant had contracted to pay for the project.
(R. 34, 45, 229, par. 11, 286, 293 and 298)
Construction time for the originally contemplated
high-rise and also for the yet to be designed revised project was estimated at 730 calendar days (R. 49-50, 288,
289). After said abandonment of the original project
and partial payment of architectural fees, Defendants
decided to build the revised project in two phases and
to defer construction of the Court Building portion until
the first phase was completed so as to permit use of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the police building until the new police facilities were
completed. This two-phase program resulted in actual
construction time of 1736 days (R. 299), (approximately
2y2 times the 730 days contemplated by the parties when
they entered into the original and supplemental agreements) (R. 27 and 36).
The architect was required under the terms of the
agreement to provide services during the entire construction period, and his claims result from the additional construction time and from changes ordered by
the Defendants. The agreement included the following
provision: (Portion of Paragraph #4 of Agreement)
"EXTRA SERVICES AND SPECIAL CASES.
If the Architect is caused extra drafting or other
expenses due to changes ordered by the Owner, . . .
he shall be equitably paid for such extra expense
and the service involved . . " (R. 29, 4).
Plaintiff's claims, which were dismissed by the
Court, are for extra drafting and expenses resulting
from changes ordered by the Defendants (Owners)
within the meaning of said contractural provision, and
are basically as follows:
Item # 1 . (R. 47, 60-61) Claim for attending
approximately 75 meetings with Citizens' Advisory
Committee (contract named City Engineer as representative of Defendants [R. 32, par. 13] and requiring Plaintiff to attend said meetings constitutes
extra work not contemplated by the contract [See
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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also explanation in Plaintiff's answer to Defendant's interrogatories]) (R. 238-240, par. # 2 ) .
Item # 2 . (R. 38 & 61). Claim for extra work
resulting from preparation of new drawings to
replace those abandoned by Defendants when Defendants changed the type of facility desired (after
Plaintiff had worked for 10 months under the direction of Defendants' representative on the originally contemplated project.) (See also explanation
in Plaintiff's answers to interrogatories — R. 229230, Par. 1 & 12). The agreement provides in part
as follows: (R. 29, Par. # 4 ) (Portion of Paragraph
# 4 of Agreement)
"If any work designed or specified by the
Architect is abandoned or suspended, in whole
or in part, the Architect is to be paid for the
service rendered on account of it."
See also contractural provision for payment to
Architect for extra work and expenses quoted on
page 3 above and found at (R. 29 & 47).
Item # 3. Not involved in appeal.
Item # 4 . (R. 50 & 64-68) Claim for extra
drafting and other expenses resulting from the
later decision to build the project in two phases
extended the construction period from the originally contemplated 730 days (R. 243, Par. 8, 267) to
actual construction time of 1736 days. That decision
to extend construction period was made well after
execution of the supplemental agreements. (R. 36
and 45, 245, Par. 8 (j), 269.) (Accordingly plaintiffs
claim could not have been waived by the supplemental agreement.)
Item # 5 . Not involved in appeal.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Item # 6 . (R. 53 & 68) Claim for extra work
in connection with assisting in the defense of a
taxpayer's lawsuit filed against Defendants herein
in connection with awarding of bid for jail equipment contract. (See also R. 231, Par. 24, R. 239, Par.
2(f)).
Items # 7 and 8. (R. 53-54, 89). Claims for space
analysis survey and square foot analysis to determine space requirements to Defendants in connection with size of structure to be constructed and to
determine portion of completed space occupied by
each of the Defendants. This work was extra work
not included in the contract between the parties.
Defendants acknowledged that they were indebted
to plaintiff for those services (R. 89-90, Par. 7 & 8)
(The Court overlooked that admission of liability
and improperly dismissed those claims).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
MARY JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL.

SUM-

Since disputed issues of fact exist which, if resolved in favor of Plaintiff, would entitle Plaintiff to
recover against Defendants, the granting of summary
judgment in this matter was improper. Summary judgment should be vacated and the case remanded for
trial on the merits. DAV v. Hendrixson, 9 U. (2d) 152,
340 P.2d 416; Hatch v. Sugarhouse Finance Co., 20 U.
(2d) 156, 434 P. 2d 758.
The agreement between Plaintiff and the Defendants
specified no time for construction of the project to be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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designed by Plaintiff (R. 27, 36 and 45), however, the
sworn answers to interrogatories filed by Plaintiff indicate that at the time of execution of the agreements the
parties contemplated building a structure requiring a
period of not to exceed two years (730 days) to construct. (R. 243, Par. 8). As a result of the later change to
a two-phase project the actual construction time was
1736 days (R. 50 & 64), an increase of 1006 days. The
bulk of Plaintiff's claims relate to extra work performed
and extra expenses incurred by Plaintiff in performing
professional services during the additional 1006 days
construction period. The Court ruled that Plaintiff's
claims were waived by the supplemental agreements
(R. 34 & 45). The Court erred in that determination.
The following issues of fact exist which are in dispute
and require testimony and evidence at a trial, thereby
precluding the granting of summary judgment:

1. UNDISPUTED CLAIMS IMPROPERLY DISMISSED.

Plaintiff's claim (items #7 and 8) for extra compensation for space analysis and square foot analysis
(R. 53-54, 69) (see page 5 above) are not disputed
by Defendants who have acknowledged liability therefor. See letter of Feb. 4, 1970, (R, 89-90, par. 7 and 8)
wherein Jack L. Crellin, City Attorney, recommends to
the Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County Commissions
that those claims be allowed. The Court odviosuly overlooked Defendants' admission of liability in granting
summary judgment dismissing those claims. If Defendants now dispute items #7 and 8 then an issue of fact
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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exists which requires a trial to determine whether or
not Plaintiff is entitled to be paid for that extra
work. The record is wholly devoid of any affidavits,
admissions, pleadings, etc. which would justify summary judgment of dismissal, particularly in view of rule
concerning summary judgments to the effect that for
purposes of such a motion plaintiff is entitled to have the
court survey the evidence and all reasonable reference
fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff. Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 U. (2d)
30, 395 P.2d 62.

2. TWO-PHASE CONSTRUCTION DECISION CONSTITUTES A CHANGE ORDERED BY THE OWNERS.

Since the later decision by the Defendants to construct the project in two parts or phases was made well
after the parties entered into the supplemental agreements (R. 34 and 45), execution of those agreements
could not constitute a waiver by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has
a right to recover additional compensation, under the
terms of the agreement, for extra services furnished
at the request of the Defendants. If Defendants dispute
the fact that the decision to build in two phases was
made after the execution of the supplemental agreements, then an issue of fact remains to be tried with
respect to when the project was changed from a single
phase project to a two-phase project. See also discussion
on page 6 above and R. 50 & 64, paragraphs #4; PlainDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
tiff's answers to interrogatories, (R. 243, Par. 8); also see
discussion in memorandum to the Court, * R. 263-278.
Issues of fact remain for trial as to whether or not after
the parties had entered into the agreements employing
Plaintiff, including the supplemental agreements, the
Defendants changed the project from one which contemplated a construction period of 730 days to one requiring a construction period of 1,736 days, and whether
or not said change by the defendants constituted extra
work for which Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated
within the meanings of paragraphs # 4 and 7 of the
agreement between the parties (R. 29, Par. #4; R. 30,
Par. #7. See page 13 hereof). The agreement between
the parties is silent as to the time contemplated for construction of the project and accordingly is ambiguous in
that regard so parole evidence is admissable to establish
the intent of the parties as to the contemplated construction period for the project. Continental Bank & Trust Co.
v. Bybee, 6 U. (2d) 98, 306 P.2d 773; Spite v. Brickhouse,
123 NE 2d 117, 49 ALR2d 673; Hite v. Aydlett, 132 SE 149;
Svarz v. Dunlap, 235 P. 801, 271 P. 893; Stacy-Judd v.
Stone, 12 P2d 143; Mitterhausen v. S. Wise. Conf. Asso., 14
NW 2d 19; Parsons v. Brvston Dev. Co., 402 P. 2d 839; 5
Am Jur 2d Architects Sec. 19, P. 682 and cases there
cited. There is probably no better evidence of the intention of the parties to build a single bulding of one-phase
construction than the fact that Beecher, under the direction of the agent for the Defendants, worked for 10
months on a single phase building project (R. 229 & 230).
See Trucker Sales Corp. v. Potter, 104 U. 1,137 P. 2d 370.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3. SERVICES IN TAXPAYER'S LAWSUIT ARE EXTRA
SERVICES.

Issues of fact remain for trial as to whether Plaintiff is entitled to recover for additional services furnished by Plaintiff at the request of Defendant in connection with a lawsuit filed against Defendants by a
taxpayer contesting the awarding of the jail equipment
Contract, and whether or not those services were included in the duties of Plaintiff under the terms of the original agreement, or whether Plaintiff for some other reason
is not entitled to recover for those services. The record
is devoid of any affidavits, admissions, pleadings or
other documents which would support summary judgment of dismissal of this claim. (R. 53 & 68; R. 231, Par.
24 [answers to requests for admissions]; R. 239 last par.)
See also discussion on page 5 above.
4. SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS.

DO NOT

BAR

An issue of fact remains for determination as to
whether or not execution of the supplemental agreements (R. 36 & 45) constitutes a bar to Plaintiff s claim
for extra work and expense in re-designing the Metropolitan Hall of Justice project from a single building
to the present multiple building arrangement. (R. 47-48;
60-63; sworn answers to requests for admissions R. 299230; sworn answers to interrogatories R. 239). Testimony is required to determine the intent of the parties
with respect to whether or not early payment of $36,000.00 on the fee (to which Plaintiff was already entitled
under its agreement with Defendants) was intended to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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constitute a waiver of Plaintiff's claim for extra work
in re-designing the project after abandonment of work
that was partially completed at the time that Defendants changed the type of structure which they desired.
(a) Supplemental agreements contain no waivers
by Plaintiff. If the supplemental agreements (R. 36 &
45) do not waive Plaintiff's right to collect for said
extra work, Plaintiff is entitled to be paid therefor under
the terms of paragraphs #4 and 7 of the agreement
quoted on pages 3, 4 and 13 herein (R. 29, Par. #4 and
R. 30-31, Par. #7). See also Fitzgerald v. Walsh, 107 Wis
92, 82 NW 717. An analysis of that agreement reveals
that the Defendants simply waived the requirement of
prior approval by their Boards of Commissioners of
work done to that date (because that work was being
abandoned due to change of type of structure desired
by Defendants), and therefore Defendants agreed to
pay $36,000.00 toward the total architectural fee for the
entire project earlier than it was otherwise due. (R. 29,
Par. #5). This was reasonable in view of the fact that
Beecher had worked for almost 10 months and expended
large sums of money working on the plans that were
abandoned. The parties agreed that the value to the
Defendants of the services rendered to that time was
$36,000.00, (R. 34, Par. 2 and R. 45, Par. 2); that the
original agreement would remain in full force and effect;
that the waiver of prior approval of work by respective
Commissions of Defendants applied only to that single
payment and that said payment constituted full payment
for all services to November 10, 1960. There is absolutely
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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nothing in that agreement which precludes Plaintiff from
asserting a claim for extra drafting and other expenses
incurred after November 10, 1960, in re-designing the
project using the new concept developed thereafter.
Defendants are the ones who changed the type of structure which they desired and Defendants should be required under paragraphs # 4 (see pages 3 and 4) and 7
(see page 13) of the agreement to pay for those changes.
(R. 29-31).
Plaintiff was coerced (R. 229) into accepting $36,000.00 at that time rather than approximately $120,000.00
claimed by Plaintiff to have been earned to that date
when the work being done was abandoned (R, 286).
(b) Supplemental contracts void for lack of Consideration. Since the failure of the Defendants to approve the work done by Plaintiff under the direction of
Defendants' representative was not due to any default
by Plaintiff, but was solely the result of Defendants
changing the type of structure which they wanted, the
unilateral decision of Defendant not to approve that
work is insufficient consideration to support the supplemental agreements; the $36,000.00 had already been
earned and was payable for abandonment of work done
by Plaintiff as provided by paragraph # 4 of the agreement (R. 29); accordingly said partial payment of fees
already earned is not consideration which would support
the supplemental agreements; therefore said supplemental agreements are simply not supported by consideration and are void and unenforceable. Defendants cannot any more avoid payment for services rendered by
Plaintiff by refusing to approve work done under the diDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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rection of Defendants' designated representative than an
owner could avoid payment to a contractor because an
architect wrongfully failed to approve work that had
been satisfactorily done. Plaintiff has not been paid a
single cent for the extra work caused by abandonment
by Defendants who now seek to construe the supplemental agreements as agreements that Plaintiff was in
essence making a gift to Defendants of 10 months work
and to thereby prevent Beecher from being paid for redoing work done in good faith and abandoned through no
fault of Beecher. A fair reading of the supplemental
agreements leads to the conclusion that Defendants simply didn't want to pay more than the $36,000.00 for the
abandoned work, which obviously was worth many times
that amount. Had Defendants intended that no claim be
made for extra work in bringing the work on the revised
project to the same point as the work on the prior project
when the abandonment occurred, they would have said
so in the supplemental agreements. Those agreements
were drafted by the Defendants and any ambiguity therein should be construed most strongly against the Defendants. Skousen v. Smith, 493 P. 2d 1003, 27 U. (2d)
169; Seat v. Tayco, Inc., 400 P. 2d 503, 16 U (2d) 323;
Huber & Rowland Const. Co. v. City of South Salt Lake,
323 P. 2d 238, 7 U. (2d) 273; Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 500
P. 2d 1007, 28 U. (2d) 231.
Aided by this presumption and rule of construction,
the meaning of the supplemental agreements (R. 36 &
45) is uncertain and require testimony and evidence
to determine if Plaintiff's claim for extra compensation
for re-designing and re-drafting of the new project after
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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execution of the supplemental agreements is barred by
the terms of those agreements and, if so, whether or
not those agreements are enforceable in view of Plaintiff's claim of economic coercion in inducing the execution of those agreements and claim by plaintiff that
the agreements are not supported by consideration. (R.
229, Par. # 1 1 , sworn answers to requests for admissions
and R. 284-309).
5. P L A I N T I F F IS CONTRACTUALLY ENTITLED TO BE
PAID FOR ADDITIONAL EXPENSES.

Plaintiff was unable to perform the work contemplated under paragraph # 7 of the agreements during
the construction period with a single inspector because
of the spread out nature of the re-designed project and
was required to use additional employees throughout the
construction period (R. 244, Par. 8 ( e ) ) . Plaintiff was
also required to maintain an office staff to work on Defendants' project during the entire 1736 days construction
period for which Plaintiff has not been reimbursed. Paragraph # 7 of the agreements between Plaintiff and Defendants (R. 30-31) provides in part as follows:
"The architect shall furnish at his expense a
qualified on-site inspector . . . during the entire
time the construction work is in progress, whose
duties shall consist of checking all shop drawings
. . . to determine the quality and acceptance of the
material and/or equipment proposed to be used in
the facilities being constructed; to supervise and
inspect all phases of the work being done."
The costs, to be paid by the Architect for the
above services to be rendered, shall not exceed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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$15,000.00. In the event these services exceed this
amount, it is hereby agreed by all concerned that
the owner shall assume all costs in excess thereof."
(emphasis added).
Defendants paid the additional costs applicable to
one of the inspectors who supervised construction, but
have refused to pay the cost of additional employees
hired by Plaintiff to perform a part of the work specified
in paragraph #7 (which simply could not be done by a
single man), and have refused to pay the additional expenses incurred by Plaintiff as a result of the job being
extended for over 1000 more days than was contemplated
by the parties at the time that they executed the various
written agreements (including the supplemental agreements R. 36 & 45).
Defendants argue that the limit of their liability
under the agreements paragraph #7 (quoted above)
is payment for a single inspector. Since the parties did
not contemplate the additional 1,000 day construction
period paragraph #7 is ambiguous as to what expenses
were intended to be paid thereunder. Since Defendants
drafted the agreements they should be construed most
strongly against Defendants. (See cases cited on page
12 above). The dispute as to the expenses to be paid
by Defendants under the language used in paragraph
#7 of the agreements, particularly when construed with
the language of paragraph #4 thereof, (see page 4
above) requires a trial and production of testimony and
evidence, and precludes the granting of summary judgment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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SUMMARY
Suit by architect for additional fees and expenses
claimed to be owed for extra work ordered by Salt Lake
City and Salt Lake County in connection with design
and construction of Metropolitan Hall of Justice project.
Architect worked for approximately 10 months under
the direction of the representative of Defendants designing a single high-rise building, then Defendants required that those drawings be abandoned and instructed
the architect to design the present multiple-building
facility. Defendants at that time waived the contractural
requirement of prior approval by City and County
Commissions of work done and made a partial payment
to Architect on the total Architectual fee due under the
original agreement, the parties agreeing that the amount
paid was in payment for work done to that date.
Court granted summary judgment at pre-trial dismissing Plaintiff's claims for extra fees on theory that
said partial papment was a waiver by Plaintiff of right
to collect for extra work done thereafter. Plaintiff claims
to be entitled to payment for that extra work under
provisions of Paragraphs # 4 and 7 of the agreement between the parties. No affidavits were filed by Defendants in support of their motions for summary judgment.
Contested issues of facts remain unresolved which must
be tried, which if resolved in favor of Plaintiff would
entitle Plaintiff to judgment against Defendants, including:
A. Plaintiff's claims for extra compensation for
space analysis and square foot analysis (R. 53-54, 69,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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par. #7 and 8) (which are not disputed by Defendants
but which were erroneously dismissed by the court)
(R. 89-90, par. #7 and 8).
B. Decision by Defendants to construct project in
two parts (which resulted in extending construction
time in excess of 1,000 days more than contemplated
by parties at time of the agreements between Plaintiff
and Defendants) was made well after execution of supplemental agreements which Defendants claim is a waiver of Plaintiff's right to be paid for extra expenses and
services for that extra 1,000 days of construction time.
If Plaintiffs claim is accurate the supplemental agreements could not be a waiver to a decision not yet made. If
Defendants deny that said decision was made later, then
an issue of facts exists which must be resolved by trial,
thereby precluding summary judgment. This item constitutes the largest of Plaintiff's claims.
C. The record contains no admissions or affidavits
which support summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs
claim for extra compensation for services furnished by
Plaintiff in connection with Defendants' defense of a
taxpayer suit involving the award of the jail equipment
contract. An issue of fact remains for trial as to whether
or not Plaintiff is entitled to be paid for those services.
D. The supplemental agreements are ambiguous as
to whether or not their terms preclude Plaintiff from
asserting a claim for re-drafting of abandoned drawings
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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using the new project concept, which ambiguity should
be most strongly construed against Defendants since
they drafted the instruments. Those agreements simply
waive conditions precedent to payment of a part of the
architects fee and fix the value of the services rendered
to that date. Nothing in those agreements preclude
Plaintiff from asserting the claims asserted in this lawsuit. A trial is necessary to resolve that ambiguity.
E. The consideration recited in the supplemental
agreements is that of waiver of approval of work by City
and County Commissions, which approval obviously
would not be given since the drawings had been abandoned as the result of Defendants changing type of facility which they desired. The agreements recite that
the work done was worth the amount paid and Plaintiff
is entitled to payment therefore under paragraph # 4
which requires Defendants to pay for designs and specifications which are abandoned. (R. 29, Par. # 4 ) . Accordingly a dispute of fact exists as to whether or not
there is consideration to support said agreements or
whether they are void for lack of consideration (R. 229,
Par. # 1 1 ) . This dispute precludes the granting of summary judgment and makes a trial necessary.
F. A dispute which requires a trial exists with respect to the right of Plaintiff to recover under paragraph
# 7 of the agreements (R. 30-31, Par. # 7 ) for expenses
and services furnished during the construction period.
Defendants claim that Plaintiff can collect for only a
single employee. Plaintiff claims that it is entitled to be
paid for all expenses incurred by it in performing the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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services required under paragraph #7 (found on page 13
above), the performance of which required the services
of more than the single employee, because of the spreadout revised project.
It is respectfully submitted that the Court erred in
granting summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint and that the judgment of the lower court should
be vacated and the case remanded for trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD C. BARKER
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Appellants
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